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Three basic points can be made about the protection,by means of international law, of cultural propertyin armed conﬂict. None is momentous or
profound, but each is a useful corrective to seemingly
popular and potentially harmful assumptions. First, states
and other past parties to armed conﬂict have placed more,
and more sincere, value on sparing and safeguarding
immovable and movable cultural property, at least since
1815, than might be assumed. Next, the international legal
protection of cultural property in armed conﬂict is not a
pipe-dream. Finally, the criticism that concern for the
wartime fate of cultural property displays callousness to the
fate of people is misplaced.
VALUE PLACED ON PROTECTION
Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, states and other
parties to armed conﬂict have placed greater value on
protecting cultural property than might be assumed.
Perhaps it is not saying much, given the seemingly
entrenched view that cultural property has always been
deliberately attacked and looted in war, or its protection at
best ignored. But it is no less true for that.
For a start, states have expended considerable energies
on elaborating a demanding and sophisticated body of
international rules speciﬁcally directed towards the
protection of cultural property in armed conﬂict.
Some of these rules are to be found in the various
general conventions on the laws of armed conﬂict. The
1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 1907 Hague Convention IX on
naval bombardment, 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to
the Geneva Conventions, and the 1980 and 1996 Protocols
to the Conventional Weapons Convention on mines,
booby-traps and other devices all contain speciﬁc
provisions on cultural property. Conversely, of the general
conventions on the protection of cultural property, the
1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property contains an article relevant to armed conﬂict.
Alongside these treaties there have also evolved
customary international rules of a criminal nature for
punishing wartime mistreatment of cultural property. In
the wake of World War One, the draft list of war crimes
prepared by the 1919 Preliminary Paris Peace Conference
recognised the wanton destruction of cultural property as
criminal, and France sought the extradition from Germany
of 16 individuals implicated in war crimes of a cultural
nature. After World War Two, the Nuremberg tribunal
convicted several defendants, chief among them Alfred
Rosenberg, of war crimes and crimes against humanity for
their roles in the Nazi plunder and destruction of cultural
property in the occupied territories to the east. At the
other end of the scale of gravity, a French military tribunal
at Metz held a German soldier responsible for the
destruction of a war memorial and a statute of Joan of Arc
in a small town in occupied France. In more recent times,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia has been vested with jurisdiction over war
crimes in relation to cultural property, and has developed a
body of relevant authority in cases such as Strugar and Jokic´
(both dealing with the shelling of the Old Town of
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Dubrovnik) and Plavs´`ic´ Blas´`kic´ , Kordic´ , Naletilic´ and
Brd-anin (all on the devastation of cultural property in
Bosnia-Herzegovina). The International Criminal Court
has been granted an analogous jurisdiction by the Rome
Statute.
Most tellingly, states have adopted several speciﬁc
conventions on the protection of cultural property in
armed conﬂict, treaties which trace their origins to a 1919
report of the Netherlands Archaeological Society, as
reﬂected in a provision of the 1923 draft Hague Rules on
Aerial Warfare and later in the 1938 Preliminary Draft
International Convention for the Protection of Historic
Buildings and Works of Art in Times of War. In 1935, the
Seventh International Conference of American States
concluded the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and
Scientiﬁc Institutions and Historic Monuments, known as
the Roerich Pact, applicable to both war and peace. The
Pact is still in force among 11 American states, although it
is for all intents and purposes a dead letter. Far more
signiﬁcantly, in 1954 states adopted the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conﬂict, along with its First Protocol. The
Convention was updated and added to in 1999 by the
adoption of a Second Protocol. The Convention currently
has 166 states parties, the First Protocol 93 and the Second
Protocol 44. This treaty regime remains the cornerstone of
the international legal protection of cultural property in
armed conﬂict.
All these normative efforts can be summed up in the
following basic rules, applicable to international armed
conﬂict (including belligerent occupation) and non-
international armed conﬂict alike, consonant with
customary international law and non-exhaustive. To begin
with, it is prohibited to attack cultural property unless it
makes an effective contribution to military action and its
destruction offers a deﬁnite military advantage. It is also
illegal to attack a military objective, such as a tank, a
military headquarters or a munitions factory, if this cannot
be done without inﬂicting on nearby cultural property
damage out of proportion to the military advantage
anticipated. The demolition of cultural property under a
party’s own control is forbidden too unless military
necessity imperatively requires it. It is further prohibited to
use cultural property for military purposes unless there is
no other feasible way to obtain a similar military advantage.
All forms of theft, pillage, misappropriation, conﬁscation
or vandalism of cultural property are similarly unlawful.
Parties to an armed conﬂict are required to prohibit,
prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to all such acts. They
are also forbidden to seize or requisition cultural property
situated in the territory of an opposing party. Individuals
responsible for intentional attacks on, other destruction of,
or plunder of cultural property may be punished for war
crimes, and widespread or systematic destruction or
plunder of cultural property can qualify as a crime against
humanity. As speciﬁcally regards occupied territory, an
occupying power must prohibit and prevent any illicit
export, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural
property, and must as far as possible support the
competent authorities of the territory in safeguarding and
preserving cultural property.
Where the 1954 Hague Convention and/or its Protocols
apply, additional obligations arise, and special institutions
and mechanisms for the enforcement of these obligations
come into play. For example, states parties must prepare in
time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property
situated within their own territory against the foreseeable
effects of an armed conﬂict, by taking such measures as
they consider appropriate. Such measures include, as
appropriate, the preparation of inventories, the planning of
emergency measures for protection against ﬁre or
structural collapse, the preparation for the removal of
movable cultural property or the provision of adequate in
situ protection of such property, and the designation of
competent authorities responsible for the safeguarding of
cultural property. Under the Second Protocol, a state party
in occupation of the whole or part of the territory of
another must prohibit and prevent any archaeological
excavation in the occupied territory, save where this is
strictly required to safeguard, record or preserve cultural
property. The same applies in respect of any alteration to,
or change of use of, cultural property which is intended to
conceal or destroy cultural, historical or scientiﬁc evidence.
Over and above the general rules which apply to all cultural
property, the Convention and Second Protocol provide for
optional regimes of “special” and “enhanced” protection
respectively, providing in theory for a higher standard of
protection in respect of a narrower range of property. The
Second Protocol embodies a detailed regime of war crimes
provisions. The Convention provides for elaborate (and in
practice dysfunctional) implementation and compliance
mechanisms, and the Second Protocol has created both an
intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conﬂict and a
Fund for the same.
Nor has the wartime protection of cultural property
been merely on paper. Since 1815, good will,
conscientiousness and a broad consensus that cultural
property should, where at all possible, be spared in armed
conﬂict have ﬁgured more prominently than might be
thought. Where such qualities have been lacking, fear of
the consequences, especially in terms of public opinion,
has tended to compel compliance. Indeed, the historical
record shows that malicious destruction and plunder of
cultural property by armed forces and ﬂagrant disregard for
its wartime fate have been exceptions over the past 200
years – devastating and not uncommon exceptions, but
exceptions all the same, and condemned by other states.
Of course, any argument to this effect runs up hard
against World War Two. But the ﬁrst point to be made is
that, leaving aside the Nazis’ depredations in the occupied
territories to the east, the destruction of cultural property4
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during the war was mostly not prohibited by international
law as it stood at the time, and was rarely premeditated or
nonchalant. This includes, for the most part, the Allies’
strategic bombing campaign over Germany, in relation to
which the UK’s secretary of state for air told the Commons
in 1942, it would seem sincerely:
Monuments of art and antiquity are the common heritage of
all mankind. We do not deliberately destroy them, but it is
our policy to restore that greater heritage of mankind—
freedom—and to do that we must and will destroy the
enemy’s means of making war – his defences, his factories, his
stores and his means of transportation, wherever they may be
found.
This should not be taken to mean that each and every
Allied strategic air raid was lawful. In many instances, for
example the devastation of Dresden and the US raids on
Japan from late 1944, the already-elastic notion of a
military objective was stretched very arguably beyond
breaking point. But rarely were such acts in wilful deﬁance
of the law. The same goes for other notorious examples of
the destruction of cultural property during the war, such as
the tactical aerial attack on the Benedictine abbey at Monte
Cassino and Field Marshal Kesselring’s swingeing
demolitions in Florence. The genuine military necessity for
either action must be seriously in doubt, but neither was an
act of outlawry. One exception to this pattern was the
ﬁrebombing of Lübeck (although the town was chosen not
for its history as such but for its wooden construction),
which in turn led by way of retaliation to the Germans’
“Baedeker raids” on Exeter, Bath, Norwich, York and
Canterbury, undertaken with the perhaps-rhetorical
intention of destroying every building in England marked
with three stars in the famous guidebook.
Conversely, World War Two witnessed conspicuous acts
of cultural solicitousness. Despite being the second capital
of the Axis and the focal point of the railway lines from
southern to northern Italy, Rome was spared Allied
bombing until July 1943 in explicit recognition of its
cultural signiﬁcance; and when it was bombed, special
techniques were used and precautions taken to avoid
hitting cultural property. It was a similar story with
Florence and Siena. As regards Japan, although many of the
US raids were of questionable legality, Kyoto and Nara
were spared on cultural grounds. In the land war,
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (“MFA&A”) ofﬁcers
accompanied US forces throughout Europe, advising
commanders as to the location of and care to be given to
cultural property – a practice imitated by the British, for
example in Libya. General Eisenhower’s General Order No
68 of 29 December 1943, on the preservation of historic
monuments in the mainland Italian campaign, emphasised
the care to be taken to spare cultural property, and
promulgated rules to this end. The order reiterated in
more emphatic terms one to the same effect during the
Sicilian campaign, and was followed by a directive of 26
May 1944 for western and central Europe, as well as by
Title 18 (“Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives”) of the
Military Government Regulations for the US zone in
occupied Germany. For its part, the German Kunstschutz or
art protection corps took considerable pains to safeguard
cultural property in southern and western Europe
(although its efforts were undermined by the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg, a special unit for the plunder of works of art, by
the Special Purposes Battalion of the Waffen SS of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, directed by von Ribbentrop, by
the archaeological corps of the Ahnenerbe, the SS’s special
research division, and by operatives working on the
personal behalf of Göring and Bormann respectively). In
the same vein, Kesselring insisted on abandoning Rome
without a ﬁght, and without engaging in the routine
military practice of demolitions to hinder pursuit. (The
ﬁrst Allied soldier to enter Rome the following morning
was a US MFA&A ofﬁcer, in accordance with a plan drawn
up six months before.) Similarly, the commander of
occupied Paris, General von Choltitz, deliberately delayed
carrying out an initial order to destroy all the bridges over
the Seine, and eventually ignored Hitler’s command to
defend the city “stone by stone”, choosing instead to
surrender without a ﬁght.
In subsequent conﬂicts too, the international rules on
the protection of cultural property in armed conﬂict have
by and large been observed. For example, prior to the air -
and sea-launched missile strikes which ushered in the 1991
Gulf War and which accompanied the invasion of Iraq in
2003, and prior to the aerial campaign over Yugoslavia in
1999, US military planners, in consultation with civilian
experts, identiﬁed and placed on a special “no target” list
signiﬁcant cultural property in the countries in question.
During the ﬁrst of these conﬂicts, when Iraq positioned
two ﬁghter aircraft next to the ancient ziggurat at Ur,
Coalition commanders decided not to attack them after
weighing the value of their destruction against the risk of
damage to the historic site. Similarly, when in 2002 a large
number of armed Palestinian militants took up positions
inside the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, the Israel
Defence Forces refrained from an assault on the site, the
standoff eventually being resolved through international
good ofﬁces.
It is best, however, not to overdo the point. Appalling
exceptions to the overall historical pattern of compliance
and good faith since 1815 are not hard to ﬁnd: the Nazis’
colossal devastation and seizure of the cultural heritage of
the occupied territories to the east, Iraq’s plunder of
Kuwaiti cultural institutions in 1990, the shelling of the
Old Town of Dubrovnik in 1991 and 1992, the systematic
razing of places of worship, many of them centuries old,
and other historic landmarks such as the Old Bridge at
Mostar during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
failure of US forces to guard Iraqi cultural institutions
during the 2003 invasion, to name a few. Moreover, it is
cold comfort that much of the destruction of cultural
property during World War Two was not prohibited by the 5
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laws of war as they then stood. But a frank recognition of
these points does nothing to undermine the essential truth
of the conclusion that states have made a greater effort
since the end of the Napoleonic Wars to spare cultural
property in armed conﬂict than seems to be assumed –
and, indeed, that such efforts have in practice been the
norm.
UNREALISTIC?
Contrary to common assumption, the protection of
cultural property in armed conﬂict by means of
international law is not a hopelessly unrealistic
proposition.
The greatest cause of the wartime destruction of cultural
property since 1815 has been its incidental damage in the
course of bombardment of otherwise lawful targets. Such
destruction reached its dreadful apogée in the World War
Two Allied strategic bombing campaigns over Germany and
Japan. But the signal failure of international law to prevent
the devastation from the air of much of these countries’
cultural heritage was in many ways anomalous, a function
of a speciﬁc moment in both the laws of armed conﬂict and
military technology: legally, the classical rules on
bombardment had been rendered obsolete but the regime
that would come to replace them was still underdeveloped;
technologically, the massive increase in the explosive yield
of ordnance and the capacity to deliver it from the air had
not been adequately matched by advances in the precision
with which it could be targeted. Thanks, however, to
crucial legal and technological developments since 1945,
today there is a greater possibility than ever before of
sparing cultural property from damage and destruction in
war.
The laws of war codiﬁed in the 1907 Hague Regulations
had permitted recourse to bombardment only against
“undefended” localities. If, on the other hand, a city or
town was defended, it was not just its defences that could
be bombarded: whatever morality may have said, no
positive rule of international law forbade bombardment of
civilian quarters as long as all necessary steps were taken to
spare, as far as possible, cultural property, hospitals and the
like. And the qualiﬁed rule on sparing cultural property did
not in practice amount to much, since it was difﬁcult to
spare cultural property when everything around it was a
lawful object of attack, and bombardment was not
prohibited where the foreseeable damage to cultural
property outweighed the military advantage to be gained.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the fate of cultural property hung in
the course of bombardment on the concept of a
“defended” town. But World War One exposed the
inadequacies of this concept in the age of long-range
artillery and aircraft. With the lines on the Western Front
stretching from Flanders to Verdun and beyond, every
urban centre behind them could be captured only by
ﬁghting and was therefore, in effect, defended. Moreover,
the scale of mobilisation meant that cities and towns were
full of troops, making them defended in a second sense.
They were usually also within range of defensive artillery or
aerial counteraction. The assumption, therefore, was that
virtually every single city and town was liable to
bombardment, and in the absence of any positive restraint
on bombarding civilian districts in defended towns, all
civilian property, except for cultural property and certain
protected institutions, was open to attack. As a
consequence, even if cultural property situated in a
defended town was not itself the object of bombardment,
it was often damaged in attacks on surrounding property,
as when, in March 1918, a German shell destroyed the
nave of the thirteenth-century church of Saint Gervais in
Paris, killing 88 people. If such damage was unavoidable in
the bombardment of lawful targets, it was not unlawful.
There was general agreement after World War One that
the law on bombardment was outmoded, especially as it
applied to bombing from the air. As a result, the conceptual
foundations of the law were recast. The dichotomy
between undefended and defended towns was replaced by
the more precise concept of individual military objectives.
Any town or city could, in principle, be bombed from the
air but bombing was to be restricted to objects whose
destruction would deliver a distinct military advantage to
the belligerent. But the problem was that an exhaustive list
of military and related infrastructural targets, as posited in
the 1923 draft Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare, was never
binding on states as a matter of treaty law and did not
emerge in the interwar years as customary international
law. The same went for the rule, also laid down in the draft
Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare, that a belligerent was to
refrain from bombarding an otherwise-lawful military
object if this could not be done without loss of civilian life
or damage to civilian property, including cultural property,
that was out of proportion to the military advantage
anticipated. These shortcomings reaped the whirlwind in
World War Two. The deﬁnition of a military objective
expanded to encompass any object whose destruction
would weaken the enemy’s capacity to carry on. All civilian
industry and infrastructure, and the residential districts
where the industrial workforce slept, were viewed as lawful
targets, and while targeting the general populace as such
was publicly beyond the pale, the latter’s terrorisation was,
at the very least, an intended by-product of aerial
bombardment. The greater the number of military
objectives, the greater the risk of incidental harm to
cultural property, a risk rendered a virtual certainty by
technological limitations. The “Butt Report”, delivered to
the UK’s Bomber Command in 1941, concluded that the
smallest targets in Germany operationally feasible at night
with the aircraft and highly inaccurate delivery systems
available were whole towns, so that although the British
government expressed on the outbreak of war “a ﬁrm
desire ... to preserve in every way possible those
monuments of human achievement which are treasured in
all civilized countries”, it was not thought possible from the6
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air. The secretary of state for air explained the policy to the
Commons as follows:
We cannot be prevented from bombing important military
targets because, unfortunately, they happen to be close to
ancient monuments ... The same principles are applied to all
centres. We must bomb important military objects. We must
not be prevented from bombing important military objects,
because beautiful or ancient buildings are near them.
The upshot of all of these considerations was the
practice of area bombing, in which multiple, distinct
military objectives scattered over an urban concentration
were destroyed by levelling the whole concentration
indiscriminately. As for the prevailing law, it provided that
as long as it was lawful to attack the intended objective, any
unavoidable incidental damage to cultural property was
subsumed within that lawfulness.
But today the legal and technological climates are
crucially different. A generally accepted treaty-based and
customary deﬁnition limits lawful military objectives to
objects which make an effective contribution to military
action, as distinct from the enemy’s broader capacity to
sustain the military effort. The result is far fewer military
objectives in the course of whose destruction nearby
cultural property will be placed at risk. Even more
signiﬁcantly, in what is probably the single greatest legal
advance since 1945 in the protection of cultural property
in armed conﬂict, both treaty and customary international
law now embody a restraint on incidental damage to such
property. As seen above, it is now unlawful to attack an
otherwise-lawful military objective if this cannot be done
without incidental damage to cultural property out of
proportion to the military advantage anticipated. When it
comes to technology, the advent of so-called “smart”
ordnance has improved almost beyond belief the accuracy
of aerial bombardment, at least at the hands of the military
powers most likely to engage in it. All these developments
have greatly improved the chances that cultural property
will survive war unscathed.
Again, however, it is best to remain sanguine.
There are, in the end, limits to what international law
can do to civilise war. No rules will ever stop parties to an
armed conﬂict or individual combatants who, motivated by
malice, ideology or arrogance and convinced of their
impunity, bear contemptuous disregard for law itself. The
Nazis’ devastation and seizure of the cultural heritage of the
occupied East was a phenomenon beyond the power of law
to prevent. The same is probably true of Iraq’s plunder of
the cultural institutions of Kuwait in 1990, the destruction
of historic and religious sites in the former Yugoslavia, the
use by armed militants loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr of the
Imam Ali mosque as both arsenal and refuge, and former
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s breathtaking disregard for
the security of Iraq’s museums and archaeological sites.
International law can only have purchase where abiding
with international law holds intrinsic value. History shows
that international legal compliance mechanisms—weak at
the best of times, and even weaker in war—do little to
restrain the die-hards.
Moreover, the gravest threat to cultural property during
armed conﬂict today is its theft by private, civilian actors
not bound in this regard by the laws of war. The
breakdown of order that accompanies armed conﬂict and
the corrupting lure of the worldwide illicit market in art
and antiquities continue to drive the looting of
archaeological sites and museums in war-zones and
occupied territory. The laws of war do not extend to such
private acts. And while international law does oblige an
occupying power to prevent and put a stop to all this, much
and perhaps most looting takes place in the context of non-
international armed conﬂict, where the rules on
belligerent occupation do not apply.
The point to be made, however, is that insofar as the
laws of war are capable of modifying behaviour, the rules
on the wartime protection of cultural property are as
capable as any.
CALLOUS?
Lastly, the accusation commonly levelled in the context
of its destruction that a desire to protect cultural property
in war reﬂects a callousness to human beings is misplaced.
The argument can be rebutted as a matter of formal
logic. There is no necessary reason why an interest in the
one should mean a disregard for the other. It can also be
dismissed for failing to understand the philosophical basis
of heritage protection. Cultural property is protected not
for its own sake but for the sake of the human beings who
draw meaning and pleasure from it. The ultimate end of
protecting cultural property is human ﬂourishing.
But there is also a more pragmatic answer. The
protection of cultural property in armed conﬂict is, as
history shows, simply impossible without an equal or
greater concern for the protection of civilians. If a civilian
quarter is targeted, the cultural property in its midst will
tend to suffer with it. Conversely, as the inhabitants of
Rome, Kyoto and Nara could attest, a concern to spare
cultural property from the destructive effects of war can
end up saving the lives of the local people.
Ultimately, no matter what legal and practical measures
are adopted, war is a threat to cultural property, and the
only safe bet is not to wage it.
• This article is taken from a lecture given by the author
at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on February
15, 2007.
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